In this paper, we show how nonstandard consequence operators, ultralogics, can generate the general informational content displayed by probability models. In particular, a model that states a specific probability that an event will occur and those models that use a specific distribution to predict that an event will occur. These results have many diverse applications and even apply to the collapse of the wave function.
Introduction.
In [1] , the theory of nonstandard consequence operators is introduced. Consequence operators, as an informal theory for logical deduction, were introduce by Tarski [2] . There are two such operators investigated, the finite and the general consequence operator. Let L be any nonempty set that represents a language and P be the set-theoretic power set operator. Definition 1.1. A mapping C: P(L) → P(L) is a general consequence operator (or closure operator) if for each X, Y ∈ P(L) (i) X ⊂ C(X) = C(C(X)) ⊂ L and if (ii) X ⊂ Y, then C(X) ⊂ C(Y).
A consequence operator C defined on L is said to be finite (finitary, or algebraic) if it satisfies (iii) C(X) = {C(A) | A ∈ F(X)}, where F is the finite power set operator.
Remark 1.1. The above axioms (i) (ii) (iii) are not independent. Indeed, (i) (iii) imply (ii).
In [1] , the language L and the set of all consequence operators defined on L are encoded and embedded into a standard superstructure M = N , ∈, = . This standard superstructure is further embedded into a nonstandard and elementary extension * M = * N , ∈, = . For convince, * M is considered to be a 2 |M|saturated enlargement. Then, in the usual constructive manner, * M is further embedded into the superstructure, the Grundlegend structure, Y = Y, ∈, = where, usually, the nonstandard analysis occurs. In all that follows in this article, the Grundlegend superstructure Y is altered by adjoining to the construction of M a set of atoms that corresponds to the real numbers. This yields a 2 |M| -saturated enlargement * M 1 and the corresponding Extended Grundlegend structure Y 1 [3] .
The Main Result.
To indicate the intuitive ordering of any sequence of events, the set T of Kleene styled"tick" marks, with a spacing symbol, is used [4, p. 202 ] as they might be metamathematically abbreviated by symbols for the non-zero natural numbers. Let G ⊂ L 1 be considered as a fixed description for a source that yields, through application of natural laws or processes, the occurrence of an event described by E ⊂ L 1 . Further, the statement E ′ ⊂ L 1 indicates that the event described within the statement E did not occur. Let L = {G} ∪ {E, E ′ } ∪ T. As usual, G, E, E ′ are assumed to contain associated encoded general information. Note that for subsets of L bold notation, such as G, denotes the image of G as it is embedded into M 1 .
Theorem 2.1. For the language L and any p ∈ IR such that 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, where p represents a theory predicted (i.e. a priori) probability that an event will occur, there exists an ultrachoice function * C and an ultralogic P p with the following properties.
1. When P p is applied to * {G} = {G} a hyperfinite set of "events" {a 1 , . . . , a n , . . . , * a ν } is obtained such that for any "n" trials, {a 1 , · · · , a n } is a finite identified "event" sequence, where each a i determines the labeled event E or labeled non-event E ′ .
2. The labeled events in 1 are sequentially determine by * C, where C determines a sequence g ap of relative frequencies that converges to p.
3. The sequence of relative frequencies g ap determined by * C gives the appearance of theory dependent random chance.
Proof. All of the objects discussed will be members of an informal set-theoretic structure and slightly abbreviated definitions, as also discussed in [3, p. 23, 30-31] , are utilized. [Indeed, all that is needed is an intuitive superstructure.] As usual IN is the set of all natural numbers including zero, and IN >0 the set of all non-zero natural numbers.
Let A = {a | (a: IN >0 → IN) ∧ (∀n(n ∈ IN >0 → (a(1) ≤ 1 ∧ 0 ≤ a(n + 1) − a(n) ≤ 1)))}. Note that the special sequences in A are non-decreasing and for each n ∈ IN >0 , a(n) ≤ n. Obviously A = ∅, for the basic example to be used below, consider the sequence a(1) = 0, a(2) = 1, a(3) = 1, a(4) = 2, a(5) = 2, a(6) = 3, a(7) = 3, a(8) = 4, . . . which is a member of A. Next consider the must basic representation Q for the non-negative rational numbers where we do not consider them as equivalence classes.
For each member of A, consider the sequence g a : IN → Q defined by g a (n) = (n, a(n)). Let F be the set of all such g a as a ∈ A. Consider from the above hypotheses, any p ∈ IR such that 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. We show that for any such p there exists an a ∈ A and a g ap ∈ F such that lim n→∞ g ap (n) = p. For each n ∈ IN >0 , consider n subdivision of [0, 1], and the corresponding intervals [c k , c k+1 ), where c k+1 − c k = 1/n, 0 ≤ k < n, and c 0 = 0, c n = 1. If p = 0, let a(n) = 0 for each n ∈ IN >0 . Otherwise, using the customary covering argument relative to such intervals, the number p is a member of one and only one of these intervals, for each n ∈ IN >0 . Hence for each such n > 0, select the end point c k of the unique interval [c k , c k+1 ) that contains p. Notice that for n = 1, c k = c 0 = 0.
For each such selection, let a(n) = k. Using this inductive styled definition for the sequence a, it is immediate, from a simple induction proof, that a ∈ A, g ap ∈ F, and that lim n→∞ g ap (n) = p. For example, consider the basic example a above. Then g ap = {(1, 0), (2, 1), (3, 1), (4, 2), (5, 2), (6, 3), (7, 3), (8, 4), . . .} is such a sequence that converges to 1/2. Let nonempty F p ⊂ F be the set of all such g ap . Note that for the set F p , p is fixed and F p contains each g ap , as a varies over A, that satisfies the convergence requirement. Thus, for 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, A is partitioned into subsets A p and a single set A ′ such that each member of A p determines a g ap ∈ F p . The elements of A ′ are the members of A that are not so characterized by such a p. Let A denote this set of partitions.
Let
The members of B are determined, but not uniquely, by each (n, m) such that
Hence for each such (n, m), let f nm ∈ B denote a member of B that satisfies the conditions for a specific (n, m).
For a given p, by application of the axiom of choice, with respect to A, there is an a ∈ A p and a g ap with the properties discussed above. Also there is a sequence f na(n) of partial sequences such that, when n > 1, it follows that ( †) f na(n) (j) = f (n−1)a(n−1) (j) as 1 ≤ j ≤ (n − 1). Relative to the above example, consider the following:
It is obvious how this unique sequence of partial sequences is obtained from any
† a denote the unique partial sequence of n terms generated by an a and the ( †) requirement. In general, as will be demonstrated below, it is the P f na(n) that yields the set of consequence operators as they are defined on L. Consider an additional map M from the set P F = {P f na(n) | a ∈ A} of these partial sequences into our descriptive language L for the source G and events E, E ′ as they are now considered as labeled by the tick marks. For each n ∈ IN >0 , and 1 ≤ j ≤ n, if P f na(n) (j) = 0, then M (P f na(n) (j)) = E ′ (i.e. E ′ = E does not occur); if P f na(n) (j) = 1, then M (P f na(n) (j)) = E (i.e. E does occur), as 1 ≤ j ≤ n, where the partial sequence j = 1, · · · , n models the intuitive concept of an event sequence since each E or E ′ now contains the appropriate Kleene "tick" symbols or natural number symbols that are an abbreviation for this tick notation.
Consider the set of axiomless consequence operators, each defined on L,
Then for each a ∈ A p , n ∈ IN >0 and respective P f na(n) = P na(n) , there exists the set of consequence operators C ap = {C({M (P na(n) (j))}, {G}) | 1 ≤ j ≤ n} ⊂ H. Note that from [1, p. 5] , H is closed under the finite ∨ and the actual consequence operator is C({M (P na(n) (1))} ∪ · · · ∪ {M (P na(n) (n))}, {G}). Applying a realism relation R (i.e. in general, R(C({G})) = C({G})−{G}) to C({M (P na(n) (1))}∪· · ·∪{M (P na(n) (n))}, {G})({G}) yields the actual labeled or identified event partial sequence {M (P na(n) (1)), . . . , M (P na(n) (n))}.
Due to the set-theoretic notions used, one now imbeds the above intuitive results into the superstructure M 1 = R, ∈, = which is further embedded into the nonstandard structure * M 1 = * R, ∈, = [3] . Let p ∈ IR be such that 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, where p represents a theory predicted (i.e. a priori) probability that an event will occur. Applying a choice function C to A, there is some a ∈ A p such that g ap → p. Thus * C applied to * A yields * a ∈ * A p and * g ap ∈ * F p . Let ν ∈ * IN be any infinite natural number. The hyperfinite sequence {a 1 , . . . , a n , . . . , * a ν } exists and corresponds to {a 1 , . . . , a n } for any natural number n ∈ IN >0 . Also we know that st( * a µ ) = p for any infinite natural number µ. Thus there exists some internal hyperfinite P f ν * a(ν) ∈ * P F with the *-transferred properties mentioned above. Since * H is closed under hyperfinite ∨, there is a P p ∈ * H such that, after application of the relation * R, the result is the hyperfinite sequence S = { * M (P ν * a(ν) (1)), . . . , * M (P ν * a(ν) (j)), . . . , * M (P ν * a(ν) (ν))}. Note that if j ∈ IN, then we have that * E = E or * E ′ = E ′ as the case may be.
An extended standard mapping that restricts S to internal subsets would restrict S to { * M (P ν * a(ν) (1)), . . . , * M (P ν * a(ν) (j))}, whenever j ∈ IN >0 . Such a restriction map models the restriction of S to the natural-world in accordance with the general interpretation given for internal or finite standard objects [3, p. 98 ]. This completes the proof.
Remark 2.1. Obviously, for theorem 2.1, each E or E ′ exist separately. The conclusions may be viewed conditionally and as ordered responses. That is, based upon the source, if only a single or a few E or E ′ are obtained, one would conclude that these events are among sets such as S and they correspond to the probability statement if the trails continued under the exact same conditions. I note that, in a recent paper [5] , it has been shown that general logic-systems and finitary consequence operators are equivalent notions. Throughout all of the mathematical results that deal with ultralogics, two ultralogic processes are tacitly applied whenever necessary. For a nonempty hyperfinite set X, there is an internal bijection f defined on [1, ν] , ν ∈ * IN >0 and f : [1, ν] → X. Such an f is a hyperfinite choice operator (function). When useful, this function can also be considered as inducing a simple order on X via the simple order of [1, ν] . For any nonempty simply ordered finite standard set Y of cardinality n, an induction proof shows that there exists an order preserving bijection g: [1, n] → Y such that g(i) < g(j), i, j ∈ [1, n], i < j. Consequently, for any hyperfinite set X with a simple order such an order preserving internal f exists. This (internal) bijection is the hyperfinite order preserving choice operator (function). These two operators are considered ultralogics since they model two of the most basic aspects for deductive thought.
For theorem 2.1, the labeling of each E ′ , E is only used to differentiate between the occurrences or non-occurrences of an event relative to the source generator G. For a finite number of events or non-events, the actual order usually has no relation to the probability that an event will occur. Thus, S can be considered as representing a hyperfinite choice operator and any other hyperfinite choice operator f : [1, ν] → S can be applied without altering the convergence properties. The maps that are obtained by restricting such hyperfinite operators relative to S are standard and internal hyperfinite (indeed, finite) choice operators.
The choice function C is an essential part for the development of many of the mathematical theories used within the physical sciences. It is an essential requirement for the deductive thought that yields these mathematical theories. The use of such a C is consistent with all of the other basic set-theoretic conclusions. The hyperchoice function * C is but the usual nonstandard extension of C that exists within our nonstandard structure.
Distributions.
Prior to considering the statistical notion of a frequency (mass, density) function and the distribution it generates, there is need to consider a finite Cartesian product consequence operator. Suppose that we have a finite set of consequence operators C = {C 1 , . . . , C m }, where each is defined upon its own language L k . Define the operator ΠC m as follows: for any X ⊂ L 1 × · · · × L m , using the projections pr k , consider the Cartesian product pr 1 (X) × · · · × pr m (X). Then ΠC m (X) = C 1 (pr 1 (X))×· · ·×C m (pr m (X)) is a consequence operator on L 1 ×· · ·×L m [5, Theorem 6.3]. If, at least one C j is axiomless, then ΠC m (X) is axiomless. If each C k is a finite and axiomless consequence operator, then ΠC m is finite. All of these standard facts also hold within our nonstandard structure under *-transfer.
A distribution's frequence function is always considered to be the probabilistic measure that determines the number of events that occur within a cell or "interval" for a specific decomposition of the events into various definable and disjoint cells. There is a specific probability that a specific number of events will be contained in a specific cell and each event must occur in one and only one cell and not occur in any other cell.
For each distribution over a specific set of cells, I k , there is a specific probability p k that an event will occur in cell I k . Assuming that the distribution does indeed depict physical behavior, we will have a special collection of g ap k sequences generated. For example, assume that we have three cells and the three probabilities p 1 = 1/4, p 2 = 1/2, p 3 = 1/4 that events will occupy each of these cells. Assume that the number of events to occur is 6. Then the three partial sequence might appear as follows    g ap 1 = {(1, 1), (2, 1), (3, 1), (4, 2), (5, 2), (6, 2)} g ap 2 = {(1, 0), (2, 1), (3, 2), (4, 2), (5, 2), (6, 3)} g ap 3 = {(1, 0), (2, 0), (3, 0), (4, 0), (5, 1), (6, 1)} Thus after six events have occurred, 2 events are in the first cell, 3 events are in the second cell, and only 1 event is in the third cell. Of course, as the number of events continues the first sequence will converge to 1/4, the second to 1/2 and the third to 1/4. Obviously for any n ≥ 1, g ap 1 (n) + g ap 1 (n) + g ap 3 (n) = n. Clearly, these required g ap i properties can be formally generated and generalized to any finite number m of cells.
Relative to each factor of the Cartesian product set, all of the standard aspects of Theorem 2.1 will hold. Further, these intuitive results are embedded into the above superstructure and further embedded into our nonstandard structure. Hence, assume that the languages L k = L 1 and that the standard factor consequence operator C k used to create the product consequence operator is a C ap k of Theorem 2.1. Under the nonstandard embedding, we would have that for each factor, there is a pure nonstandard consequence operator P p k ∈ * H k . Finally, consider the nonstandard product consequence operator ΠP p m . For * ({G 1 } × · · · × {G m }) = {G 1 } × · · · × {G m }, G i = G, this nonstandard product consequence operator yields for any fixed event number n, an ordered m-tuple, where one and only one coordinate would have the statement E and all other coordinates the E ′ . It would be these m-tuples that guide the proper cell placement for each event and would satisfy the usual requirements of the distribution. Hence, the patterns produced by a specific frequency function for a specific distribution may be rationally assumed to be the result of ultralogic processes.
The specific information contained in each G i and the corresponding E i , E ′ i employed in this article are very general in character. Although it would be unusual, for the above results, it is not necessary to assume that for each i, G i = G, E i = E, E ′ i = E ′ . Let the language L 1 ⊃ L. Note that, whether for distributions or the results in section 2, the nonstandard product consequence operator ΠP p m when applied to any internal
yields, after application of the general hyperrealism relation * R applied to each coordinate, the same result as if the application was only made to {G 1 } × · · · × {G m }. For such cases, it may not be necessary to apply the realism relation when observations are being considered since such observations should differentiate between the source G and the events by various means.
From a physical viewpoint, it should be obvious that, in this model, what is "observed" is the effect of the single coordinate projection that yields the E or E ′ . Further, how the E, E ′ are described must be carefully considered. For example, consider the original Rutherford and Geiger (1910) observations for the collisions with a small screen of alpha particles emitted from a small bar of polonium. Then E = "x is the number of alpha particles observed during an eight-minute period," and E ′ = "x is the not number of alpha particles observed during an eight-minute period." As is well know, the experimentally observed counts closely follow a Poisson distribution.
Collapse of the Wave Function.
Within quantum measure theory, the notion of the Copenhagen interpreta-tion that yields the collapse of the wave function is often criticized as an external metaphysical process [6] . However, this interpretation is consistent with the logic that models quantum measure theory. When a physical theory is applied to the behavior of a natural-system that actually alters such behavior, the theory can be represented by a axiomless finitary consequence operator S V N i . By definition, * S V N i is an ultralogic. As stated in [6, page 31,32 ] "In other words, the wave function of the apparatus takes the form of a packet that is initially single but subsequently splits, as a result of the coupling to the system, into a multitude of mutually orthogonal packets, one for each value of s. Here the controversies over interpretation of quantum mechanics starts. . . . According to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, wherever a state vector attains the form of equation 5 [|Ψ 1 = s c s |s |Φ[s] ] it immediately collapses. The wave function, instead of consisting of a multitude of packets, reduces to a single packet, and the vector |Ψ 1 reduces to the corresponding element |s |Φ[s] of the superposition. To which element of the superposition it reduces one can not say. One instead assigns a probability distribution to the possible outcomes, with weights given by w s = |c s | 2 . "
Applications of the process discussed in section 3 depend upon the types of "cells" being considered. The definition of "cell" is very general as the next application shows. Each cell can be but a single term within a finite or infinite series. If the "multitude of mutually orthogonal packets" is finite, then a finitary and axiomless ΠP p m applies immediately and yields the collapse. Significantly, ΠP p m eliminates all of the intermediate mathematical steps since ΠP p m relates any source specific information to any event specific information, where specific information generates the real physical content.
If the multitude of packets is an infinite set, then the Cartesian product notion would need to be defined in terms of "mappings" along with the axiom of choice. Since the internal ΠP p m exists for any n ∈ IN 0> , then there exists such an operator ΠP p ν for any ν ∈ * IN 0> . This ΠP p ν has all of the same first-order internal settheoretic properties as each ΠP p m . In particular, when restricted to the standard infinite set of packets and the required standard distribution, application of the ultralogic ΠP p ν yields the collapse. For both of these ultralogic collapse processes, the same remark 2.1 holds.
